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A. COMBAT SURVIVABILITY. . ..A TECHNOLOGY ISSUE
In the skies today and or. the drawing boards for
tomorrow are military aircraft that ars t=:chnDlog:.cal
marvels. The F-15, and F/A-18 are saperior fiahrsr ard
attack aircraft that employ the very latest ir.
state-of-the-art technologies in computers, flight control
systems, engines, and structural materials. These machines
have been optimized to levels heretofore unobtainable,
Psrformance has bean built-in to these aircraft. And so has
something else, Survivability. These aircraf- were
designed tc perform their assigned combat missions in the
face of modern arsenals and tc return zo -heir bases -o fly
again. However, the question must bs asksd, have these
aircraft designs realized the utmost in survivability
benefits that modern digital systems tachnologies have to
offer?
Because history has shown that ths importance of
survivability has sometimes bs^n forgotten or neglected in
the design and development of military aircraft in
peacetime, it is incumbent upon the aircaft designer, the
military program manager, and the combat aviator to en3ur=
10

that today's technological advances, particularly ir. tb.~
applicaticn of computer augmented flight conircl systems,
continue to provide the survivability enhancement features
thax will keep the cutting edge of our nation's defense
keen.
3. 0. S. MILITARY SU RV IV AEILITY POLICY
Survivability has been increasingly emphasized by the
U.S. Armed Services in recent years. The Depar-ment of
Defense and the Military Service Branchss have established
firm survivability policies regarding arms acquisitions.
The primary objective of the U.S. Military Survivability
Policy is to ensure that effective survivability enhancemen-
features are incorporated in current and all future U, S.
weapons systems.
A triservice organization, the Joint Technical
Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability (JT33/AS)
,
created in 1971, has brought together the oest expertise i:
each of the service branches to plan and ex'^cuta a
comprehensive program to increase the survivability of
current and future aircraft assets. Within the JTCG/AS
charter are tasks to develop design criteria and improved
technology to increase the survivability of future combat
aircraft and weapons systems.
11

C. SURVIVABILITY REQUIREMENTS/GUIDELINES/Sr ANDARDS
Survivability requiremsnts for airborne weapon sys-^-ms
hav€ bsan specified in different ways by each brar.ch of th-:
Armed Services. The Navy establishai ASPONAQTICAL
REQUIREMENT (AR)-107, "Navy Aircr?.ft
Survivability/Vulnsrability (Naclear/Ncnnaclear) ," in V37U.
MIL-STD-2072 (AS) , "Military Standard: Survivabili-: y
,
Aircraft; Establishment and Conduct of Programs for,"
superseded AR-107 in 1977. In 1981, Ihs Depar-men- of
Defense issued MIL-STD-2069, "Requirements for Aircraft
Nonnuclear Survivability Programs." Each document was
prepared in recognition of the need for a s-andardiz'rd
systems approach to improving the survivabili-y of U.S.
military aircraft.
DOD MIL-STD-2069 provided guidelines and reguiremen-cs
for establishing and conducting aircraft survivability
programs. Applicability of the principles contained therein
apply to all major weapons system acquisi-ion programs and
is the standard invoked in contractual agreements regarding
aircraft armaments.
Various forms of handbooks have been prepared to provide
military planners and industrial designers with the
12

informatioL and guidance n?ed<=d in incorporating
survivability feataras into new and existing systsms. Th^
Air Fores Systsms Command has published a design handbook
series, DH-1 through DH-3 (with suppla:nent3) for use with
Air Force programs. The Army has publisaad a "Survivability
Dasign Guide for Army Aircraft," USAAMRDL rR-71-ai. T'n<~
Navy established MIL-HDBK-268 (AS) , "Survivability
Enhancement, Aircraft Conventional Weapons rhr-eats. Design
and Evaluation Guidelines," in August 1982 for use in the
acquisition process of Naval aircraft systems. Jointly, the
three services work within the guidelines established by thr
JTCG/AS and published in several volumes as
D3D-MIL-HDBK-336, "Survivability, Aircraft, Nonnuclear,
(Various) . "
D. WHY BE CCNCEENED WITH AIRCRAFT FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS?
The essential question of flight control surviv=ibility
was derived by the author from a stateman- aminating from an
analysis of Southeast Asia combat files maintained by the
Combat Data and Information Canter (CDIC) . The statement
attributed approximately 25% of all aircraft lost in
Southeast Asia to the functional loss of the aircraft's
flight control system as a result of combat induced damage.
13

This percentage figura equated to nearly SCO aircruit.
Preliminary investigation revealed thai; tha flight control
system of most conventional comba- aircraft contributed
approximately 5% to the aircraft's total pr'^ssnted ar^a.
The disproportionality of the two figures generated a
concern that culminated in the development of the guidelines
contained herein.
E. PURPOSE
The purpose of this treatise is to present in a single
document guidelines for the development of aircraft flight
control systems (FCS) with specific emphasis on increasing
the combat survivability of aircraft aguipped with
Fly-By-Wire (FEW) flight control systems.
F. SCOPE
The scope of this effort was limitad to nonnuclear
weapons effects considerations. The Fly-by-Wire flight
control systems development guidelines presented within werr
developed in connection with the damage causing mechanisms
associated with conventional weapons systems, self generated
electromagnetic interference (EMI) phenomena, and normal
inflight environmental/meteorological conditions to be
expected in the conbat aircraft's operating environment.
14

II. FUNDAMENTAL SURVIVABILITY CONCEPTS
A. WHAT IS AIRCRAFT COMBAT SURVIVABILITY?
Aircraft combat survivability has bser. d-^finad as "-.h?
capability of an aircraft (weapon systai) to avoid and/or
withstand a man-made hostile environment" [Ref. 1].
Paramount in this definition is the ability "-o avoid ar.d/or
withstand." The inabili-y "to avoid," th^ hosiile
environment is referred to as su sceptibili-y . The inabiliry
"to withstand," the hostile environment is referred to as
vulnerability.
Susceptibility, often measured as the probability cf
being hit, Ph, can be divided into three general categories:
(1) Defensive weapon system thre=t activity
(2) Detection, identification, and tracking by
defensive weapon systems
(3) Engagement by defensive waapon systems (i.e.,
missile laanch or gun firing; warhead guidance;
warhead impact or detonation)
The susceptibility of an aircraft can be influenced by
the aircraft's signatures, the tactics and supporting forces
employed, and the integral survivability enhancement
equipment carried on or within the aircraft. Small size.
15

increased maneuverability, low visual/radar/anral/inf rar si
signatures, terrain masking/te rrain following -actios,
active/passive electronic count ermeasures, decoys, and
antiradiat ion missiles are but a limits^ sal=-c"^-ion Tif. -he
means to reduce an aircraft's susceptibility.
Vulnerability, often measured as ths probability cf
being killed if hit, Pk/h, is a direct function and cieasure
of the aircaft's design, and any survivabili-y enhancement
feature that reduces the amount and effsct of damage induced
by an enemy's wsapon systems damage mechanisms.
Vulnerability is influenced by the ability of a sy3-e:n to
continue to operate after being hit and by design features
and equipment that prevent or suppress damage. A flight
control system that continues to function after sustaining a
hit by a damage mechanism on one cf i-s components is an
example of reduced aircraft vulnerability.
B. SUPVIVABILITY ENHANCEMENT CONCEPTS
Survivability enhancements have been generally
categorized as any feature of an aircraft, any =quip«ient
carried, any tactic employed, or any combination thereof
that reduces the susceptibility and/or the vulnerability of
an aircraft. Survivability enhancements can be separately
16

concentra-ted in*Q either susc=ptibili-y reduction f? = -ures
or vulnarability reducticn fsaturas. Those specific
susceptibility and vulnerability reduction features can be
summarized generically into conceptual sl8m9nT:s. The firs-
of the two categories relating the major survivability
enhancement concepts is listed in Table I.
TABLE I









As presented in Table I, a reduction in an aircraft's
susceptibility can be brought about by decreasing its
detectability through signature reduction. Reducing an
aircraft's ability to be detected and tracked by an enemy
can best be accomplished in the design process.
Incorporation of quieter, smokeless engines, utilizing rada:
17

absorbent materials, eliminating sharp edges (corr.Tr
reflectors), and prescribing low IP. reflective paint schemes
are examples of this technique. Alerting the crew to
impending missile Dr gun activity can be achieved through
the use of appropriately selected warning receivers.
Incorporating electronic counter measures devices, such as
noise jammers and deception repeaters, can degrade or
prevent an enemy's defensive systems abili-y to achieve a
suitable weapons firing solution. Expendables, in the form
of chaff, infrared flares, and off-board decoy devices, can
confuse and degrade an enemy's weapon systems by masking an
aircraft's true identity or location. Hinimiza-ion of
exposure to an enemy's defensive network can be achieved
through a suitable selection of tactics alternatives.
Examples of this technique can be found ia operational plans
that take advantage of terrain following/terrain masking
flight profiles and that utilize stand-off or
launch-and-leave weapons. The impact of craw skill and
experience and the increased parformance capabiliries of th-5
modern fighter/attack aircraft, brough- about, in part, by
the incorporation of FBW flight control systems technology,
can have a major impact on tactics silection. Threat
18

suppression, the ability to activ?ly deny the 9n=my an
unhindered opportunity to fire his weapons, can bs a-hi?v^d
by attacking his weapons emplacements with such means as
anti-radiation missiles and coordinated supporting fire from
ancillary units.
The six concepts described above comprise susceptibility
reduction, the avoidance portion of the survivability dual.
Completing the dual are six vulnerability reduction
concepts. These six complementary concepts are presented in
Table II.
TABLE II





(5) Passive Damage Suppression
(6) Active Damage Suppression
Vulnerability reduction can be b=st achieved in the
design phases of an aircraft's de velopm=nt. Judicious
selection of the location of critical componen-s to minimize
19

the possibili-^y of. damage and shielding thosa critical
CDmponsnts to prevent damage mechanisms from striking th?
components, rendering them unssr vicable, are -cechniqaes mcs-
suited to be achiBved during the early design phases.
Incorporation of more than one component to perform a
critical function (component redundancy) can have = major
impact on the vulnerability of an aircraft or aircraft
system. Additional reductions may be achieved through the
elimination of components entirely (cooipDnent elimination) .
Passive and active damage suppression reduces aircraf-
vulnerability either by controlling the effects of damage
mechanisms or by reducing or preventing the subseguent
spread of further damage causing effects.
Suitable attainment of an appropriate level of aircraft
survivability can be achieved through ths incorporation of
elements from each of the survivability enhancement concep-s
described. However, it must be notsi that not all
survivability enhancement concepts are necessary or
appropriate for any particular aircraft type on any
particular mission. Paradoxically, a redaction in
vulnerability may lead to a greater degree of
susceptibility, such as the case faced by the designer when
20

adding large amounts of armor plate to an aircrafr, ^hareb/
increasing the ability to tolerate a hit, but making the
aircraft more susceptible to being hi- by raducing its
speed. Consequently, the early identification and
successful incorporation of those survivability enhancement
features that most significantly increase the survivability
of the aircraft's flight control system and increase the
mission effectiveness of the combat aircraft as a weapons




III. FLIGHT CONTSOL SYSrE^IS
A. FLIGHT CCNTRCL BASICS
Flight path control of an aircraft is accomplished by
msans of a complex series of slectrical, hydraulic, and
mechanical devices collectively titled the flight control
system (FCS) . These basic elements, when transformed into
sensors, signal paths, actuators, and surface panels,
provide the means by which the pilot comaiands an aircraft
in-flight about the three axes of motion.
Conventional military aircraft utilize rhree primary
control surfaces to control the three dimensional motion of
the aircraft: the elevators, the rudder and the ailerons. A
right-hand orthogonal axis system and the motions produced
by the associated control surfaces are illustrared in Figure
3. 1.
Deviations froi the basic control surfaces are functions
of the geometric shape of the aircraft. In some aircraft
configurations, the elevators are replaced by a solid
horizontal tail, designated either a stabilator or
stabilizer by the nanuf acturer , which moves as a single unit
to provide pitch control. In some aircraft, -he tail
















Figure 3.1. Befsrence Axes/Control Surface Deflections
assymmetr ically to provide pitch and roll control. This
type of tail surface is known as a differential stabilator.
Tailless aircraft employ elevens in place of ailerons and
elevators to provide pitch and roll control. Flaperons
replace ailerons in still other designs.
Additional surfaces, such as speedbrakes, spoilers,
leading and trailing edge flaps, and leading edge slats, ara
23

classified as secondary or auxiliary control surfaces.
These devices provide an aircraft a maans of speed and
direct lift control, and can be used as back-up control
surfaces. Despite the nomenclature and physical
differences, the primary function of a particular control
system configuratiDn remains to guide the aircraft in "chree
dimensional flight,
B, MECHANICAL FLI3HT CONTROL SYSTEM BASICS
Conventional flight control surface movements are
commanded by the pilot through the control column and
control pedals. Movement of the elevator and ailerons is
commanded by means of a stick or wheel controller, and
movement of the radder is prescribed by a pair of rudder
pedals. The basic mechanization scheme is illustrated in
Figure 3,2. The control column and rudder pedals are
mechanically linked to the control surfaces by cables,
pushrods, and bellcranks as illustrated in Figure 3,3 for a
longitudinal control system,
C. POWER-ASSISTED CONTROL SYSTEM BASICS
Most high speed military combat aircraft require some
form of powered flight control system to give the pilot
adequate ccntrcl of the aircraft throughout the flight
24


















Fore/Aft Cable Quadrants Bell Cranks
Figure 3.3. Mschanical Longitudinal Control System
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envelope. Conventional power-assisted control system
designs usually derive the additional power by means of
hydro-mechanical devices. The fundamental configuration is
depicted in Figure 3.4. The hydraulic pump, selector valve,
servcactuators, and associated plumbing, while adding weight
and complexity to the control system, provide the additional
power required. Artificial feel devices are generally
incorporated in the mechanical linkage to provide feedback
to the pilot. Figure 3.5 illustrates the basic
mechanization of a conventional hydraulic powered
longitudinal control system.
D. FLY-BY-WIRE (FBW) CONTEOL SYSTEM BASICS
Many modern, high technology combat aircraft employ
fly-by-wire flight control systems. In the basic
configuration, illustrated in Figure 3.6, the pilot is
linked to the control actuators by electrical wires.
The electrical wiring provides the control signal paths tha-
transmit the pilot's commands zo the servoactuators.
Sophisticated artificial feel devices provide feedback tc
the pilot. The basic FBW control system configuration is
electrically noisy, and the aircraft is prone to pilot





A centralized system with
engine mounted pumps to
supply hydraulic fluid











Figure 3.4. Hydraulic Power System Hechanization
aircraft, a series of electronic filters is often inserted
in the system between the pilot and the electro-mechanical
selector device to reduce nois9 transients.
E. COMPUTER AUGMENTED FBW CONTROL SYSTEM BASICS
High speed computers, in-line with the basic FEW flight
control system, may be used to either augment or provide the











Fore/Aft Cable Quadrants Hvd Surface
Actuator
Figure 3.5. Hydraalic Powered Longitadinal Control System
flight environment through ths addition of motion and rate
sensors coupled to the ccmput«=r relieves the pilot of The
responsibility to continuously monitor his flight path.
One of the most sophisticated applications of a digital
computer augmented FBW flight control system in a military
combat aircraft is the McDonnsll-Douglas F/A-18 "Hornet."
This aircraft employs high speed digital computers i.i-lin.5
with a state-of-the-art FBW system to provide the very






The conventional mechanical linkage
between the pilot's control input
and mechanical controller is replaced
by an electrical signal used to













Figure 3.6, Fly-by-Wire Control Systsm Bechanization
The functional design cf the F/A-18 Digital Fly-by-Wir«
(DFBW) flight control system is illustrated in Figurs 3.7.
The basic mechanical and electrical FCS subsystems are
diagrammed in Figure 3.8. The basic hydraulic FCS
subsystsms are depicted in Figure 3.9. Note the mschanical




POU » Power Drive Unit
LVOT » Linear Variable Differential Transformer
Figure 3.7. F/A-18 FCS FunctiDaal Diagran
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PRIMARY SYSTEM • QUADRUPLsX CONTROL-etV-WIRd
BACKUP SYSTEMS • DIRECT ELECTRIC LINK
TO ALL SURFACES
• MECHANICAL TO STABILIZER










Figure 3.8. F/A-18 FCS Elsc/Mech Subsystem Diagram
Figure 3.9. F/A-18 FCS Hydraulic Subsystem Diagrai
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IV. FCS FAILURE/ CAM AGE MODES IDENTIFICATION
A. SYSTEM VaiNERABILITY CONTRIBUTIONS
Each individual component of an aircraft has a Isvel of
vulnerability that contributes to the overall vulnerability
of the aircraft. Certain components conrribuxe more than
others, and those components which, when damaged or
destroyed, lead to an aircraft loss are the ones of interest
here. These components are known as critical components.
The systemmatic identification of the critical components
and the quantification of the vulnerability of individual
components is a part of the overall aircraft vulnerability
assessment. As the vulnerability contribution cf each
component, subsystem and system is assesssd, various methods
may be implementsd to reduce the overall aircraft
vulnerability. The vulnerability reduction technique (s)
chosen for implementation in the FCS must allow the FCS
design to remain within the constraints of cost, weight,
performance, accessibility, and maintainability, et cetera
imposed by contractual agreement.
32

B. IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS
One purpose of a vulnerability assassmant is the
identification of those components whose damage or loss
could lead to an aircraft kill, A gensral procadurs has
been formulated for determining the critical components,
their possible damage or failure modes, and rhe effects of
the damage or failure on the continued operation of the
aircraft [ Bef . 1 ].
Fundamentally, the procedure is comprised of three
steps:
(1) selection of an aircraft kill level.
(2) formulation of a complete technical and functional
description of the aircraft.
(3) the identification and delineation of the critical
compcnents.
''• Aircraft Kill Levels
Combat damaged aircraft and aircraft systems suffer
performance degradations in varying degrees. The level tc
which the performance degradation progresses can, in
general, be categorized as an attrition kill, a mission
abort kill, or a forced landing kill.
33

An attrition kill is defined as that msasurs of
aircraft damage that results in the loss of the aircraft
from the inventory. Repairabili ty and economy of repair are
factors which may contribute to to an attrition kill without
the physical loss of the aircraft. However, it is the
elapsed time from damage onset to eventual aircraft loss
which provides the scale with which to differentiate between
attrition kill levels. Several attrition kill levels have
been defined; such as "KK", "K", "A", and "B", impressed on
a time to aircraft loss scale. Detailed kill level
descriptions are contained within DOD
MIL-STD-336-1 [Hef. 2].
A mission abort kill is defined as that measure of
aircraft damage which results in an aircraft, failing to
complete its assigned mission, but that dees not result in a
loss of the aircraft from the inventory.
A forced landing kill, specifically applicable to
helicopters, VTOL, and certain V/STOL aircraft, is defined
as that measure of aircraft damage that causes the pilot to
land his aircraft short of the intended iastination, and the




2. Aircraft Tachnical and Functional Dascri^r ^oii
At each saccsssive stage of the aircraft design
process, the technical and functional descriptions of
aircraft systems and components become better defined.
These descriptions, with individual component and systems
dimensions, materials, operations and functions interfaces,
scale and perspective drawings, and aircraft location
profiles, comprise the detailed technical base for use in
the vulnerability assessment. Gathering and continuously
updating this data base, as it is f ormulaxed, should be
given a very high priority.
3- Critical Component Identification Procedure
A sequenced procedure has been formulated to
identify the critical components [Ref. 1]. The first step
in this analysis procedure for the FCS is to identify the
flight essential functions that the FCS must perform in
order to continue to accomplish the aircraft's mission. The
second step is to identify those FCS subsystems and
components that provide or perform the assential functions.
The third step is to conduct a failure mode and effects
analysis (FMEA) and/or a fault tree analysis (FTAI to
identify the relationship between the individual component
35

or subsystem failure and the essential, func-ion (s) it
provides or perforis. The fourth step, th-s damage modes and
effects analysis (DMEA) , consists of relating the component
or subsystem failure modes to combat damage causes. The
final step in the process, the presentation of the results,
is often expressed in a logical sequence )cnown as a kill
expression, or represented graphically as a kill tree.
*• Procedural Example - Generic DFBW ?CS
To illustrate this dynamic process, the flight
control system of a generic fighter/attack aircraft will be
utilized. The time scale of a " B" level attrition kill will
be imposed for illustrative purposes.
A schematic representation of the example DFBW PCS
layout is shown in Figure 4. 1. Specific technical and
functional interfaces are depicted in Figure 4.2. The FCS
utilizes dual, high speed digital compiters, quadruple
transmission signal paths, two independent hydraulic
systems, and dual, tandem hydraulic actuators at all control
surfaces. No back-up mechanical control linkage is
provided.
Flight essential functions are those that are




















Figure U.I. Generic DFBi FCS Illustration
lass than level 3 as defined by MIL-F-8735C [Ref. 3]. Each
mission phase constitutes an evaluation point in the
process. Mission phases foe a typical mul-cipurpose
fighter/attack aircraft include takeoff, climb, outbound
cruise, descent, target ingress, ordnanca delivery, -carget
egress, climb, inbound cruise, descent, and landing, as
shown in Figure 4.3. Figure 4.4 delinaatas -^hose flight
















PDU = Power Drive Unit
LVDT = Linejr Variable Differential Tran'Jormei
Figure U.2. Technical/Functional Interfaces - DFB» FCS
To fly and conduct the aircraft's mission requires
the continued operation of those supporting sysTisBs or
subsystems that provide or perform the essential FCS
38

1. Takeoff 7. Target Egress
2. Climb 8. Climb
3. Cruise ^. Cruise
4. Descent 10. Descent
5. Target Ingress 11. Landina
6. Ordnance Delivery
Figure 4,3. Fighter/Attack Mission Profile Phases
function. The level of severity and tioae criticality of
loss of these supporting systams or subsystams musr be
evaluated during this process step. Figure 4.5 depicts a
sample tabulation of some of those major supporting systems
and subsystems. In depth and detailed analyses of each
individual supporting element must, be carried out as each of
these elements becomes sufficiently dafinad during the
dasign process. A sample tabulation of a more detailad




































Essential Functions s. aission Phases
inlr^l s n i1 f nn r*- -' or ;al
data base provides
^
the basis and means for further
refinements of the detailed supporting sysrsms analysis.
The third phase in ths analysis procadurs is the
failure mode and effects analysis and/or the fault tree
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Figure 4.5. Basic Systems/Subsystems Sapporting The FCS.
identifies all possible failure modes of a component or
system, documents these failure modes, and determines the
effect of each failure mode on the performance of the system
as a whole. The details of the FMEA process, and specific
procedures can be found in MIL-STD-785 rasf- 4].
Component failure modes generally considered in an



























































operation, premature operation, aid degraded or
out-of-tolerance operation. Unique failure modes may be
singularly inserted in this stage of ths process. An
example FMEA summary report for a hydraulic control surface
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Figure U.7. Exaaple FMEA Summary Report - Hyd. Actuator
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The actuator becomes a critical cDtaponen- for an
attrition kill if it jams ths control surface in. to a
hard-over condition, but it is not a critical comoonent if
it allows the control surface to remain unjammed.
Another analysis procedare, the Fault Tree Analysis,
employs a "top- down" approach [Ref. 5]. This approach
differs from the FMEA in that it assumes an undesired event
and systematically determines what failure or sequence of
failures could cause the undesired outcome. A segment of an
FT A for the example FCS is presented in Figure U.S. The
symbolcgy utilized in the FTA analysis is common to logic
systems and, as such, the FTA is often selec-ei for its
suitability with computational systems.
FCS faiLure modes that cculd rssult in aircraft
attrition have beei identified for the example FCS and are
presented in Table III.
The FMEA aid FTA related failure modes and effects
but did not distinguish the possible cause (s) of the
failure. The Damage Mode and Effects Analysis (DMEA)
provides this essential relationship. In the DMEA, the
component and subsystem failures are rela-sd to specific



















Example FCS Failure Modes - Attrition Kill
(1) Loss of control inputs
(2) Loss of motion sensor lata
(3) Loss of digital compu-2r control
(4) Loss of electrical powsr to computer (s)
(5) Loss of control signal path
(6) Loss of hydraulic system power
(7) Loss of control surface actuator
(8) Loss of control surface
these primary damage mechanisms are projectiles and
fragments, blast effects from high explosive warheads,
incendiary particles, and High Energy Lasers (HEL) . The
damage these agents may cause includes severed electrical
power distribution lines, sensor signal paths, and control
signal transmission lines; jammed mechanical linkages and
servoactuators ; loss of hydraulic pressure and hydraulic
fluid loss/leakage; fire (aggravated by petroleum based
hydraulic fluid) ; HEL burn-through and high temperature
heating or melting of FCS components, and certain
electromagnetic incompatibilities with components, devices,
cables, wiring, and connectors. Secondary daziage mechanisms
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resulting from the impact of the primary agents on the FCS
include fire, explosion, spalling, stru::tural def orna^-ion,
sparks, and fluid leakage. The DMEA process evaluates causa
and effect, and quantifies the likelihood of the outcome.
Secondary damage causes, resulting from ths primary damage
mechanism or process, are included in the evalua-ion during
this analysis phase. Detailed descriptions of the
vulnerability assessment quantification process are
presented in reference 1 and in MIL-STD-336-1 [Ref. 2]-
Failure modes can be categorized and qualitatively
aligned with the various damage causing devices or events.
Figure U.9 correllates the example FCS failure modes
presented in Table III with common conventional weapons
damage causing agents.
The next step in the vulnerability assessment
process is the actual determination of the critical
components for the selected kill level assessed.
Distinguishing between redundant and non-redundant critical
components is essential in this phase of the analysis. To
clarify this important distinction, a set of components is
defined to be redundant if the loss of one or more than one,
but not all of the components, does not result in the loss
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Failure/Damage Modes Damage Mechanisms
' '
' ' 1 '
Penetrator Continuous Rod Fragment Blast Fire Radiation
Structural Failure Modes
Area Removal X X X X X
Overpressure X
Thermal Degradation X X
Penetration X X X
Electrical Power System
Failure Modes
Line Severance X X X X X X
Grounding X X X X X X
Avionics System Failure
Modes •
Failure to Operate X X X X X X
Degraded Operations X X X X X X
Hydraulic Power System
Failure Modes
Loss of Fluid X X X X X X
Loss of Pressure X X X X X X
Jammed Actuator X X X X X
Figure U.9. PCS Failure Hodes/Damags Causing Agents
of the essential function these components perform. If this
distinction can not be made, the ::omponents are
non-redundant. As an example, the quadruple control signal
paths shown for the example FCS form a multiply rsdundant
system because t.he essential function of providing a
48

continuous signal path is maintained evan though ons or more
than or.s individual path may bs rendered discontinuous.
Another distinction regarding redundancy must be
made. The term "analytical redundancy" refers to a .'nethod
whereby a computational algorithm is used ro predic*: an end
event or parameter. Then the prediction and a sensor
derived measurement are compared, and subsequent action (s)
taken. While not fitting the precise definition of
redundancy, the computational results can be suitably used
in lieu of the sensor output in certain circumstances.
The determination of the critical components and the
presentation format are often presented in a "kill tree" or
"kill expression." Referring to that portion of the kill
tree shown in Figure 4.10, the physical relationship to a
tree is apparent. The severance of sufficient trunk
segments may result in the loss of the tree and in the case
of the PCS, the loss of the aircraft.
Once identified, the critical oomponents may be
subject to various engineering redesigns to reduce their



















Figure 4.10. FCS Conventional Weapons Kill Trss
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V. FCS SURVIVABILITY DESIGN SaiDELINES
A. GENERAL FCS DESIGN PRINCIPLES
General design principles to reduce vulnerability should
be exercised to ths fullest extent possible throughout th3
FCS design process. Commencing with ths initial dssign
phases, a full measure of consideration must be given to tha
combat survivability of the flight control system. Of
course, the desire for increased survivability of the flight
control system must be prudently balanced with the other
requirements of reliability, maintainability, accessibility,
repairability, and safety. Concurrently, the fullest
measure of performance must bs achieved, and all these
factors must be suitably combined within stringent cost and
weight constraints. In the end, the design of ths FCS of
military combat aircraft must include suitable protection
from the primary damage causing mechanisms of conven-ional
threat weapons systems.
The six survivability enhancement concepts developed in
Chapter II (Table II, page 19) provide the foundation for
the general FCS design principles. In general, the FCS
design principles contain provision for component location
and shielding to reduce potential damage risks; elimination
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(via redesign) of high rislc, singls point failure
components; componsnt redundancy with adequate separation of
redundant components to maintain the assential flight
control function; and the incorporation of passive and
active damage suppression devices and tschnigues re minimize
the effects of incurred damage. A flight control syst?m
design that includes no single point till possibilities
should be considered a design goal.
B. SURVIVABILITY DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR FBW FCS
Specific survivability design guidelines applicable to
the individual coaponents and subsystems of a Fly-by-Wire
Flight Control System have been formulated and are herein
presented. The decision to incorporate any or all of the
design guidelines must be made prudently and with sound
engineering judgement.
"•• Mech anical System Components
a) Flight Control Surface Panels
Where possible:
• Design control surface panels of lightweight
composite materials which exhibit hign
strength-to-weight ratios and integral
redundant load carrying capability for high
ballistic damage tolerance.
• Incorporate smooth surfacs transitions to
reduce aircraft signatures.
• Incorporate multiple surface panels on each
control plane to provide redundant control
surfaces for maximum reconf igurability.
• Utilize heat resistant surface material or
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ablative materials to rstard HEL barnthrough.
b) Hinges/Control Linkages/Bearing Assemblies
Where possible:
• Design components to be jam-free.
• Utilize self-aligning bearings (e.g.
tri-p^ivot bearings) to minimiza misalignment
and jamming due to control rod, aczuator arm,
or control surface panel de formation.
• Minimize the length of mechanical control
linfeag®s to reduce the probability of
deformation or distortion.
• Utiliz? ballistically damaae tolerant
composite materials for control rods and
torque tubes.
• Design fairleads. bellcranlcs, and idler
assemblies to allow a measure of functional
performance if damaged.
• Install primary drive motors, control
linkages, interconnecting devices, and
bearing assemblies in close proximity to
primary structural members to take advantage
of the shielding afforded by the primary
structure.
• Ensure that that all control surfaces are
fitted with a "trail safe" positioning device
to prevent hardover conditions in the event
of the loss of the drive linkage.
c) Servcactuators
Where possible:
• Design all servoactuators with redundant
power sources (e.g. dual cylinder actuators).
• Design actuator pistons of frangible or
malleable materials to minimize the
possibility of jamming.
• Design actuator barrel assemblies of high
strength steel for high ballistic resistance
(e.g. Electro-Slag Remelt (ESR) Steel)
.
• Design the actuator outer-barrel assemblies
to prevent crack propogation.
• Install servoactuators in close proximity to
primary structural members for maximum
shielding.
• Install rate and position feedback linkagesm close proximity to the servoactuator
assembly for maximum shielding.
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• utilize integral reservoir, pump, and
electric pcwer packages when possible (e.g. -
Integrated Actuator Packages (lAP) )
.
• Incorporate metallic seals in place of
polymeric seals for HEL projection.
• Coat actuator housings with high temperature
resistant or ablative materials for HEL
burnthrough protection.
• Incorporate high strength ablative armor in
areas of critical componaats.
• Incorporate very high signal- to-noise ratio
servovalves for increase! EMI tolerance.
2» lill£^ii£ Po wer S ystems
a) Fluid Pressure Generation Subsystems
Where possible:
• Design hydraulic power sources to be single
or double redundant (e.g. separate dual or
triple hydraulic power sourcas)
.
• Physically separate hydraulic power sources
as much as possible to reduce the single shot
kill probability of a multiple hydraulic
system.
• Install power sources in close proximity to
main structural members to provide maximum
shielding.
• Incorporate high temperature resistant or
ablative material coatings on hydraulic pump
casss to increase HEL burnthrougn tolerance.
b) Fluid Pressure Distribution Subsystems
Where possible:
• Design fluid pressure distribution systems of
high strength, high temperature tolerant
steel lines.
• Incorporate single or double redundant
distribution lines on each separate fluid
pressure system.
• Incorporate flow sensors, check valves, and
switching circuits to bypass damaged segments
of distribution lines.
• Incoi;porate reservoir ].evel sensing devices
to isolate damaged distribution lines to
prevent fluid loss.
• Install distribution lines in close proximity
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to main structural meabsrs to maximize
shielding.
• Utilize very high pressure (i.e. UOOO-6000
psi) systems to reduce prasented area.
• Utilize high temperature resis-ant
synthetic-Based hydraulic fluid to reduce or
eliminate firs potential.
3» Electronic S2,stem Com pon ents
a) Flight Control Avionics Components
Where possible:
• Design all primary FBW FCS avionics
components with multiple redundancy (e.a.
multiple LVDT control input sansors on each
control axis input, ana jiul-^.iple diaital
flight control computersi.
• Separate redundant avionics components to
minimize single shot kill probabilities.
• Design all avionics component cases of high
strength steel for maximum ballistic
resistance,
• Coat all avionics component cases with high
temperature resistant or ablative materials-
for maximum HEL burnthrough protection.
• Design shock mounts for internal and external
components to withstand vibration and weapons
induced shock loads.
• Install avionics components in close
proximity to primary structural members for
maximum shielding.
• Incorporate high temperature resistant or
ablative armor in areas surrounding critical
components.
• Design electronic componants with suitable
particulate, vapor, and moisture protection.
b) Electronic Circuit Design
Where possible:
• Design input/output circuits of very high
Signal-to-Noise (S/N) ratio components for
maximum EMI protection.
• Minimize capacitive and inductive
cross-coupling in electronic circuits.
• Incorporate suitable self-protect, ensrgy
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dissipative circuits to provide lightning and
EMI/EHP protection (e.g. fusible links,
filters, or spark-gap devi3 = s) .
• Provide S9pa:;ats and redundant analog
chamels, with separate voting logic, as a
backup to the digital controller.
c) Signal Transmissioii Paths
Where possible:
• Design single or double redundant signal
paths between each componrQt or elemsnt in a
signal path.
• Provide suitable separation between rsdundan-
signal transmission lin9= to reduce the
single shot kill probabili*- y.
• Route signal transmission lines in close
proximity to primary structural members fcr
maximum shielding.
• Provide adequate electroEnagnetic shielding to
reduce EMI.
• Utilize high temperature resistant wire
covsring to maximize thermal/fire protection
and to minimize HEL burnthrough.
d) External Sensors/Ancillary Subsystems -
Where possible:
• Design multiple redundant external sensors
and ancillary subsystems (e.g. Air Data
Computers, and Angle of Attack systems).
• Incorporate high temperature resistant or
ablative material armor for thermal, HEL and
ballistic damage tolerance.
• Provide separate, redundant motion and rate
sensors on each of the thrse aircraft axes.
• Mount sensors to primary structural members
for maximum shielding.
• Provide analytically redundant sensory
outputs for use as checks, and as potential
back-ups.
• Provide adequate built-in test circuits with
suitable failure warning indications.
• Incorporate separate and widelv displaced
sensor signal transmission patlis.




• Design redundant control sti::k and ruid^r
inpat sensor contacts.
• Utilize sequenced voting logic and multiplex
control commands to each of the central
processing units of ths flight control
computer (s) .
• Incorporate seoarate and widely displaced
input command signal transmission paths.
'• Electrical Power Syst em
a) Electrical Power Generation
Where possible:
• Design electrical power generation sys-ems to
be multiply redundant (s.g. dual generators,
each with single generator capability)
.
• Incorporate multiply redundant AC/DC
conversion elements.
• Utilize autcmatic/manual or manually
activated ram air "curbine emergency
generators, with separate AC/DC conversion
elements.
• Design battery back-up systems.*
b) Electrical Power Distribution
Where possible:
• Design electrical bus distribution systems
for "cross-over" transient- free operation.
• Incorporate redundant control signal/power
wiring to lAP (if utilized) .
5- Environmental Control System
Where possible:
• Design separate and redundant a priori
distributed heating and cooling,
pressurizaticn , and volumetric flow systems
to critical components (e.g. flight control
computer (s) )
.
• Incorporate fail-safe temper?iture, pressure,
and volume flow sensors (i.e. a safe




• Prov3.d? ram air emergency cooling to heat
sensitive components.
• Design adequate particulats, vapor, and
moisture control devices m primary and
emergency cooling and prsssurization systems,
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VI. SDMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
In summary, it has been the author's desire to present
in a single document a clear-cut set of guidelines for the
development of aircraft flight control systems wi-h specific
emphasis on increasing the combat survivability of aircraft
equipped with FBW flight control systems. The saaterial
presented and the guidelines delineated have resulted in a
document that is as complete and concise as any single
source document can be when dealing with a fast-paced,
highly complex technical subject. This document should
therefore be viewed as a dynamic tool thai: reflects a
continuous chain of ongcing thoughts and ac-ions to
constantly update and strengthen the quality, capability and
survivability of the combat systems of our Armed Forces.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIONS
Enhanced survivability alternatives achievable through
digital FBW FCS technology should be investigated fully.
One such survivability enhancement alternative, achievabla
through digital technology, is a "self-healing",
reconfigurable aircraft flight control system.
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Consider for a moment that you are the pilot of an
aircraft that has just been hit by enemy grour.d-f ire. Yea
feel the dull thud as the enemy projectile impacts your
aircraft's aft fuselage area and now you sense the aircraft
beginning to pitch and roll without command. Your survival
instinct tells you to try every possible combination of
stick and rudder input to counter thi out-of-control
aircraft motion. Nothing seems to correct the
situation your final thought prior to ejecting from
your stricken craft is "if only "
This hypothetical example is but ons of many possible
combat related incidents that might be resolved in another
way through the use of digital technology. Consider the
possibilities afforded by digital technology in regaining
control over a combat damaged aircraft as in the
aforementioned example. With one of the horizontal
stabilators gone, an alternate combination of primary and
secondary control surfaces might be commanded by the
computer to return the aircraft to controlled flight. This
proposed survivability enhancement altsrnative could be
obtained with minimal additions to presint digital
fly-by-wire flight control configurations. The addition of
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a sensor suite, to detect and identify damaged flight
control components, and a computational algorithm to
reconfigure the aircraft control surfaces, similar in nature
to that used in artificially intelligent robot devices, ars
all that is required. Without question, succsssfull
achievement of such an adventuresome engineering task would
require a dedicated effort. Outlined in the following, is a
plan to accomplish such a project. It is the author's
opinion that sincere thought and consideration should be
given to such an undertaking in the near term.
A plan to develop an artificially intelligent,
reconfigurable flight control system «fould require detailed
engineering analyses of the following areas:
• Computational aaalysis, and wind tunnel determination
of aerodynamic lift, drag and moment coefficients on
simulated combat damaged aircrafc models (e.g. model
testing of missing, jammed or trailing-free control
surfaces m single and multiple combinations).
Development of control sur
alternatives.
face raconf igurability
• Development of suitable sensors to defect the various
levels and nodes of combat damage.
• Development of a sequenced logic or built-in test
routine to verify flight con-rol system configuration
and status.
It is the author's opinion that the fundamental
technology and expertise are present within the
military-industrial community to achieve the aforementioned
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survivability enhancemsnt alternative at low rechnological
risk and low cost. It is hoped that tomorrow's history does
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